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INTRODUCTION
I . INTRODUCTION
SUBSIDIARITY, AT LEAST as defined within the EuropeanUnion, provides that the centre will only act where the goals of theproposed action cannot, or cannot adequately, be met by decen-
tralised action.1 It therefore assumes an agreed goal, unsurprising given
its Catholic roots, and is a principle concerning who should take
measures to achieve this. This exposes two limits to the value of
subsidiarity in the EU or other international organisations:
1. Many conflicts between levels do not concern who is best placed to pur-
sue an agreed goal, but are conflicts over the relationship between the
goals of the lower and higher levels; which should prevail, or to what
extent. To this situation, subsidiarity has no relevance.
2. As a rhetorical device subsidiarity is intellectually centralising. It places
the central policy goal beyond dispute, while denying any voice to the
potentially diverging policy goals of the states. It translates the complex
relationship between levels into the single question of who can best
implement the policies of the centre.
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1 Art 5 EC: ‘In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.’ See, for an expanded version of this definition, providing clues on what
‘sufficiently achieved’ and ‘by reason of the scale or effects’ may mean, the Protocol (No 30) to
the Treaty of Amsterdam, on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality, [1997] OJ 1997 C340/105.
Indeed, its talk of the ‘goals of the proposed action’ indicates a certain
linguistic sneakiness. Actions have all the purposes possessed by those
supporting them, which may be multiple, contradictory and even
paradoxical. Speaking of the goal as if this was a simple and uncontested
attribute suggests either that all participants have a level of unity and
agreement which does not exist in the real world, or is a rhetorical trick to
avoid thinking about real people and purposes at all, and elevate the
action to a status of self-evident singularity of purpose which can only
stifle discussion.
These intellectual deficits are translated into concrete problems as a
result of the relatively imprecise delimitation of Community compe-
tences,2 and the Community law principle of supremacy. The first of these
means that there are many areas where Community and national policies
meet and potentially conflict, and that is it not possible to say with any
satisfying degree of precision what the limits to Community activities
are.3 In the internal market, in particular, the Community’s powers to
harmonise all national law obstructing movement or affecting competition
touch on many areas of activity.4 Supremacy then makes these problems
more immediate by requiring that where national and Community rules
do conflict, all national judges and authorities immediately disapply the
national rule in favour of the Community one.5 This directly effective and
widely enforced principle means that states can hardly avoid or delay
conflicts, or indulge in the luxury of limited or late compliance with
directly effective Community law.6 If states attempt to sideline Com-
munity law in favour of other policies, then in general their own judges
will call them to order.7
By embracing subsidiarity as a central idea in choice-of-level decisions
states therefore emasculate themselves. They back the wrong horse,
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2 See A Von Bogdandy and J Bast, ‘The European Union’s Vertical Order of Competences:
The Current Law and Proposals for its Reform’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 227.
3 A Dashwood, ‘The Limits of European Community Powers’ (1996) 21 European Law Review
113; R Barents, ‘The Internal Market Unlimited: Some Observations on the Legal Basis of
Community Legislation’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 85.
4 See Articles 94 and 95 EC; Barents, above n 3; J Usher, ‘Annotation of Case C-376/98’ (2001)
38 Common Market Law Review 1519.
5 See Case 6/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585; Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629;
PP Craig and G De Burca, EU Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 2007) 344–78.
6 Direct effect is the Community law rule providing that measures to which it applies
(generally those that are sufficiently clear to be justiciable, probably the majority of legislation
and Treaty texts) must be applied not only by Community courts and institutions but all
national courts and authorities too. See Craig and De Burca, above n 5, 268–304.
7 Litigants are able to pursue delinquent states and authorities in national courts, and
Community law provides procedural as well as substantive safeguards for these trials. See,
eg, J Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in
the Community Legal Order’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 9; M Accetto and
S Zleptnig, ‘The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking its Role in Community Law’ (2005) 11
European Public Law 375.
focusing on a principle that does not in fact protect their powers, with
direct and visible domestic legal consequences. This chapter suggests that
instead of concentrating on subsidiarity, which simply defends their right
to act as the delegates of the higher level and its stated objectives, states
should be calling for Community law to explicitly apply a balancing
process between the autonomous and conflicting goals of different
levels.8 The target of Member State ire should be the dominance of
subsidiarity, and its implicit presumption that all lower policies, however
important, must always give way before all higher policies, however
marginal.
The interpretative mistake that the states make, and which is often
made in popular discourse, is reading subsidiarity as no more than a
cipher for ‘which level should do what’. It is suggested here that it is a
more precise and technocratic concept than this. Ignoring its internal
structure in favour of broad policy arguments results in miscommun-
ication with the Commission,9 failed lawsuits and an inability to deal
with competence disputes in a legal way. By mislabelling conflicts
between national and Community objectives as subsidiarity issues, states
are in fact saying, although it is not what they mean to say, ‘the problem
here is deciding who can achieve Community goals best’. The Com-
mission and European and national judges therefore look at this issue
alone, ignoring the national goals. The very matter that states wished to
draw attention to, the conflicting of objectives, is therefore missed in the
judgments and decisions, no doubt to the great frustration of national
authorities.10 This chapter argues that if they used legal principles more
carefully they could avoid this misunderstanding.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEVELS
I I . CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEVELS
There are two kinds of fundamental problems that international
organisations face. One is how to achieve their goals most effectively and
efficiently. There is a tendency for institutions and bureaucracies to give
up control reluctantly, to delegate too little and to over-centralise. Yet
often, much of the work of achieving practical ends is best done by those
familiar with local circumstances—state or sub-state governments.
The other problem is how to balance the goals of the organisation
against the interests and goals of the states with which they may conflict.
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9 Particularly in the context of consultations on subsidiarity: see below n 51.
10 This is precisely what occurred in: Case C–154/04 Alliance for Natural Health (Judgment)
12 July 2005; Case C–491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I–11453; Case C–84/94 UK v
Council (Working Time Directive) [1996] ECR I–5755; Case C–377/98 Netherlands v Parliament
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In principle, one would think that states would not delegate powers to an
organisation that might conflict with their own interests. In practice, the
compromises necessary to reach international agreements mean that
international (and European) law are riddled with over-absolute, over-
simple, over-broad statements of law, which have the potential to conflict
with many other policies.
It is this latter kind of problem that has caused the greatest stress
within international organisations in recent years. In particular, the
relatively stark principles of free trade found in the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) and the EU can conflict with national policies concerning
environment, culture, consumer protection, morality and social
solidarity.11 One solution is to encourage international dispute resolution
bodies to balance these interests in their decision-making, but this entails
a transfer of power over such sensitive matters to the centre, which is
controversial for at least two reasons. On the one hand, there is resistance
to centralisation in itself, while on the other, this form of centralisation
will stimulate, and perhaps result from, increased judicial activism,
which is viewed with particular suspicion when it takes place in an inter-
national forum. For both reasons, many are unhappy with the WTO
Appellate Body or European Court of Justice having the final word on
state standards of morality or environmental protection.12 The alternative
is to soften the requirements of the trade law, which is of course resisted
on many other grounds.
Both of these kinds of problems are conflict-of-level problems, where
the essential question is which level gets to decide on some disputed
point, or which level gets to exercise the power in a certain area. Sub-
sidiarity is therefore often thought to be of help. It appears to call for the
greatest decentralisation possible, and so should provide a framework for
ensuring that sensitive and nationally variable matters are not taken over
by centralised bureaucracies or courts.13 The argument of this chapter is
that subsidiarity is no use here. It helps with the first kind of problem, the
efficiency type, but does not address the issue which presents the more
serious threat, that of the conflict of interests. Moreover, the argumen-
tative structure of subsidiarity actively suppresses and denies these
conflicts, making intelligent consideration of how to deal with them
82 Subsidiarity as a Method of Policy Centralisation
11 The literature is vast. An introduction to the issues can be found in, eg, B De Witte,
‘Non-market Values in Internal Market Legislation’ in NN Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the
Internal Market (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006) 61; J Scott, ‘International Trade and
Environmental Governance’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 307; JP Trachtman,
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13 See LC Backer, ‘Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference: An Essay on the
Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems’ (DATE??) 4
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law 185.
harder to attain. The argument is made with reference to the EU, where
subsidiarity has a history, and cases and concrete examples are used.
However, it is relevant to any multi-level organisation which thinks that
it may preserve the autonomy of its lower levels by building subsidiarity
into its rules.
SUBSIDIARITY IN THE EU
I I I . SUBSIDIARITY IN THE EU
Subsidiarity in the EU requires that the Community only act where ‘the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be achieved sufficiently by the
Member States’.14 The point of the principle, clearly, and conventionally,
is to ensure that functions are delegated to the lowest level capable of
performing them effectively.15
Subsidiarity has therefore been embraced as an intellectual and legal
framework for protecting the competences of the Member States from
unnecessary annexation by Brussels.16 Whatever the Member States can
adequately do themselves, they should. Of course, subsidiarity offers no
protection for states who wish to do things that they cannot adequately
do, but the desire to exercise competences beyond their capacity is
something that politicians tend to keep to themselves. In public at least,
subsidiarity is accepted as an appropriate guide to deciding who gets to
do what.
That is far from saying that it is unproblematic, or widely praised; the
criticisms of its vagueness are ubiquitous,17 and it is possible to debate
what level of achievement is ‘sufficient’.18 Supposing Member States
could perform a function, but just not quite as well as the EU—that ‘by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action’ there were advan-
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15 See generally: GA Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States’ (1994) Columbia Law Review 331; R Van den Bergh,
‘Economic Criteria for Applying the Subsidiarity Principle in the European Community: The
Case of Competition Policy’ (1996) 16 International Review of Law and Economics 363;
N Bernard, ‘The Future of European Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of
Subsidiarity’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 633; NW Barber, ‘Subsidiarity in the Draft
Constitution’ (2002) 11 European Public Law 197.
16 See DZ Cass, ‘The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the
Division of Powers within the European Community’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review
1107.
17 See AG Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’ (1994) 19 European Law Review 268; K van
Kersbergen and B Verbeek, ‘The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the
Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union’ (2007) 13 European Journal of Inter-
national Relations 217; D Wyatt, ‘Subsidiarity: Is it Too Vague to be Effective as a Legal
Principle?’ in K Nicolaidis and S Weatherill (eds), Whose Europe? National Models and the
Constitution of the European Union, Oxford University European Studies, available at
http://www.europeanstudies.ox.ac.uk/WhoseEurope.pdf, 86.
18 See below n 51, for documents outlining the Commission’s approach to this question.
tages to centralisation.19 Who would get to do it then? That would
depend on the meaning of ‘sufficiently’, about which there are some
comments in the relevant protocol, but nothing very concrete.20 So sub-
sidiarity does not answer the question—but at least it provides an agreed
framework, if a loose one, for finding the answer.
But is it the right question? Member States are often upset about the
Community invading their turf, but how often is their claim that they
could have achieved the goal sufficiently themselves? Actually they quite
often do make this claim, but usually because they have misunderstood
the law. In most situations their argument should be that the Community
action just is not worth doing because the costs for the states—various
kinds of costs—are so high.21 A highly quantifiable example is the impact
of free movement of services on healthcare. By requiring patients and
healthcare providers to be able to cross borders, healthcare costs are likely
to rise. Given that states do not have unlimited funds, some balancing of
interests may be necessary. More abstractly, one may consider the effect of
a measure harmonising education or language use, as discussed below in
this chapter. While having great value to the internal market, its costs in
national culture might be astronomical. Again, sensible policy requires a
balance to be made. In both cases, this balancing process is an application
of proportionality, not subsidiarity.22
SUBSIDIARITY AND SHARED COMPETENCES
IV. SUBSIDIARITY AND SHARED COMPETENCES
Looking at the various kinds of competences that the Community
has—and any other international or higher-level governance body might
have—makes these abstract statements a bit clearer, and more con-
vincing. Those competences can be categorised or described in many
ways, but a conventional division is between the exclusive and the
shared.23 The first are things that only the Community can do, like
determining the amount of tax to be collected on imports from outside
the Community. Clearly this should not vary from state to state, since the
borders between states are open. It would be the equivalent of having
different customs duties at different harbours within a state, which would
quickly put some out of business. Therefore, Member States can no longer
make any decisions about levels of duties, or at least they can only make
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20 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, above
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21 Bermann, above n 15, 339–44.
22 G De Burca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’ (1993) 13
Yearbook of European Law 105; J Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues of
Economic Integration 239; Snell, above n 8.
23 See D Chalmers et al, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 188–93.
their decisions collectively via the Community law-making processes.24
Then there are shared competences, which are found where both the
Community and Member States have the power to act in a field. An
example of this might be regulating product composition, the way
sausages and chairs are made, and so on. In the absence of Community
rules it is for the Member States to decide about things like this. On the
other hand, if every state has different rules, this could make it difficult to
import and export between them, which would hinder the free
movement of goods. For this reason, the Community has the power to
harmonise such product rules, which it exercises from time to time, when
it thinks that the problems arising are serious enough.25
Now, as is well known, subsidiarity does not apply to exclusive
competences.26 It makes no sense to ask whether the Community should
be leaving things to the Member States if the Treaty says that these states
no longer have the power to act. Subsidiarity is only relevant where
action could come from either side, the shared situation. So, let us
imagine that sausage exporters are complaining bitterly about the costs
and problems of doing business with 27 different national sets of rules (I
expect sausages were harmonised long ago, but it could be some other
product, or indeed service), and the Community thinks it would be a
good idea to harmonise. On the other hand, several Member States—but
not enough to be a blocking majority, otherwise the point might be
moot—really do not want this to happen. They do not want interference
with national rules that are established and which the states claim reflect
local traditions and preferences.27 Isn’t this what subsidiarity is all about?
Who should be making the rules on sausages?
Before answering that, one more example: there are many directives
dealing with recognition of qualifications, helping Europeans to move
from state to state and overcome the national tendencies to regard all
foreign degrees as suspect, inadequate, or both.28 These directives rely on
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25 EC, Art 95. For further discussion see G Davies, ‘Can Selling Arrangements be Harmon-
ized?’ (2005) 30 European Law Review 370.
26 EC, Art 5.
27 I am grateful to the reviewer of this chapter for pointing out that such rules could also
reflect local sausage producers’ interests and government capture. This observation captures
the tension in harmonisation perfectly. The Community will take the view that it is helping
the local consumer by freeing him from such capture and opening up national markets. But it
may be that in fact the rules are genuine reflections of local preferences. Indeed, it may not be
an either/or choice: capture may have helped form those preferences. Put another way, there
may be consumer capture by the sausage manufacturers too! Which view of the value and
nature of the rules is correct is controversial, variable and unlikely to be ‘objectively’
determinable. The temptation is to think that subsidiarity leads to deference to the states’
interpretation. They can decide on their own what local preferences are and how to protect
them. The text above argues that where Community free movement rules are involved,
subsidiarity has no such conclusion.
28 A great deal of information is available on the Commission’s web pages at http://ec.
europa.eu/education/policies/rec_qual/rec_qual_en.html.
the competence that the Community has to harmonise to remove
obstacles to the free movement of persons.29 They might have gone
further. Moving between educational systems or transferring qualifica-
tions continues to be a tricky matter, and there would have been a good
argument for harmonising the length, and at least to some extent the
content, of the different phases of education. In fact, something like this is
happening informally, as regards universities, via the so-called Bologna
process.30 In any case, it would not be difficult to make the case that such
measures would be effective and useful contributions to the goal of free
movement, and so prima facie within Community competence. But of
course, the Member States would never agree to such far-reaching
measures, which is why the more limited ones on mutual recognition are
what we in fact have.31 Yet supposing a proposal had been made for
broader harmonisation; would this not be another subsidiarity case study,
all about making sure that competences do not get taken away from the
states?
Yet subsidiarity would have nothing to do with these situations.32 In
both cases the Community wants to act in order to facilitate free
movement. By contrast, the Member States want their own rules on
sausages and education because they care about these things, and have
strong feelings about what they should consist of. The objective of
Community rules would be free movement, but the objective of the
national ones is the preservation of national standards, values, culture,
history and autonomy. In other words, there is a conflict of objectives or
interests.33 However, asking which interests should take precedence, or
how they should be balanced against each other, is quite different from
asking, as subsidiarity does, whether the objective of the Community
action can be sufficiently achieved by the states.34
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29 The legal basis for EC and EU legislation is found in the preamble. For references to
legislation, see ibid.
30 This is a process of gradual voluntary harmonisation of aspects of higher education. The
Council of Europe has an excellent guide, ‘Bologna for Pedestrians’ in its higher education
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current official Bologna Process website is also useful: http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/
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31 There is much literature on mutual recognition as a response to the desire to limit
competence transfer. See eg SK Schmidt, ‘Mutual Recognition as a New Mode of Governance’
(2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 667; K Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing
Europe through Mutual Recognition (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 682; G Davies,
‘Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization?’ in L Bartels and F Ortino (eds),
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2006) 265.
32 AG Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’ (1992) 29 Common Market
Law Review 1079.
33 Bermann, above n 15, 339–44.
34 It is of course true that in signing the Treaty states implicitly adopted free movement as a
goal of their own. However, states have multiple and overlapping goals, so the balancing
issue does not go away. It is also true that state measure may ostensibly serve legitimate goals
It might be possible for the states to try and bring their objections
within this. They could say that by having some flexibility in their
national rules, and allowing foreign products to deviate from national
standards, they can achieve ‘sufficient’ free movement, while still
preserving a degree of diversity. Then we would come back to the
argument about what ‘sufficient’ means. Here it is worth listing the
criteria that the protocol on subsidiarity provides for deciding whether
Community action should be taken or Member State action is sufficient:
 whether the issue has transnational aspects that cannot be sufficiently
regulated by action of the Member States;
 whether action by Member States alone or a lack of action by the
Community would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty or
would otherwise significantly damage Member State interests;
 whether actions at Community level would produce clear benefits by
reason of scale or effects.
It is clear from these that the focus is on achieving the goals of the
Community—in this case free movement—and the methodology is this:
first decide how much free movement the Community needs, and then
decide whether the Member States can achieve this alone. That means
that the reasons that the Member States might have for not wanting
harmonisation—autonomy and culture and so on—are not relevant to
determining what is sufficient. They have no place in subsidiarity.
One might think that this is just an oddity of the way the EU uses
subsidiarity. ‘Sufficiently’ could be used in a broad way that allowed all
kinds of factors to be taken into account. However, this would change the
nature of subsidiarity, and go against the rest of its wording.35 The
essence of subsidiarity is to ask who can reach a given goal best, whether
the higher level needs to intervene. It assumes that agreed goal. Consider
the classic religious formulation:
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but in fact be disguised protectionism. However, this is a matter for judicial review, at least
within the EU, and does not remove the balancing need when the goals are legitimate. In an
international trading system judicial determination of the true character of a measure may be
more controversial, leading to other problems. It is the particular and accepted legalisation of
the EU system which makes legal principles such as subsidiarity so important.
35 Subsidiarity in the EU is used in a way broadly consistent with that in other jurisdictions
and contexts, ie Germany and Catholic dogma. See I Pernice, ‘The Framework Revisited:
Constitutional, Federal and Subsidiarity Issues’ (1996) 2 Columbia Journal of European Law 403;
G Taylor, ‘Germany: The Subsidiarity Principle’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional
Law 115; NW Barber, ‘The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal
308; Cass, above n 16; T Schilling, ‘A New Dimension of Subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a Rule
and a Principle’ (1994) 4 Yearbook of European Law 203.
36 Pope Pius XI, Quadragisimo Anno, para 79 (1931).
So also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of
right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subor-
dinate organisations can do.36
The principle does not address, is not intended to address, the situation
where the different levels are actually trying to do different things.
Without a common goal, it is ‘nonsense’.37
SUBSIDIARITY AND PURPOSIVE COMPETENCE
V. SUBSIDIARITY AND PURPOSIVE COMPETENCES
Even if subsidiarity does not encompass the situations above, perhaps it
can nevertheless be seen as a useful tool, preventing competence creep in
other, still significant ways. A closer examination suggests not. Here it is
helpful to consider another way in which competences can be described,
dividing them into purposive and categorical powers. A purposive
power is one whose scope is defined by its goal—such as the power to
harmonise in order to achieve free movement, or perhaps to achieve
security and prevent crime—while a categorical power (I may be
inventing the phrase here, but it is useful) is one that is defined by a given
activity or function—such as the power to determine which level of
customs duties will be levied on imported goods, or the power to
determine what level of pollutants cars may be permitted to emit.
If an inter-state, or higher-level, body is attributed categorical powers,
then subsidiarity will not have much use at all. Such powers are likely to
be exclusive, for the reason that it hardly makes sense to attribute a
specific role to another body while retaining power to fulfil that role
oneself. If the Community is the body deciding acceptable levels of
contaminants in drinking water, then it follows as a matter of coherent
policy that Member States are no longer doing the same thing.
On the other hand, where purposive powers are attributed, then this is
often likely to be because the particular goals entrusted to the higher level
are ones that lower bodies acting alone cannot achieve. Hence the
Community is given the objectives of ensuring that inter-state trade and
movement work well because this goal requires co-ordination and
harmonisation of different national laws which manifestly individual
states cannot achieve. Hence subsidiarity has no relevance to such pur-
posive powers.38 Note that this is precisely the sausages and education
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33.
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example; the Community there was pursuing goals that were beyond the
capacity of the Member States alone to achieve.
So if subsidiarity has any relevance to higher bodies it will be where
they are attributed the power to achieve an objective that lower bodies
also continue to pursue, where there is a shared goal in which contribu-
tions from both sides are necessary. Examples of this might be combating
international crime or preventing epidemics or dealing with migration of
persons. Here there is clearly a role for a co-ordinating and legislating
central body, because of the international element, but much of the actual
work done will be local and does not need to be done in the same way
everywhere.39
In this context subsidiarity compensates for clumsy attribution. One
might hope that the powers of the higher body would be defined in a
sufficiently precise way that in fact there was little or no overlap with the
lower ones—as categorically as possible, one might say. Those writing
the treaties would consider which actions need to be taken at the
centre—which would usually be the co-ordinating and harmonising ones
that Member States cannot do, and to which subsidiarity has no
relevance—and only attribute powers to these. Still, there may be
ambiguity or simply bad drafting, and there may even be times when it is
necessary to have potential power on both levels, perhaps for reasons of
flexibility. Then—and only then—does subsidiarity actually have a
potential role to play.40
However, that potential probably will not be realised. If there is a
genuinely shared goal, then disagreements about which level can achieve
it best are likely to be relatively technocratic.41 That is not to say that the
issue will not be hugely political, but the political aspects are likely to
result from the interaction with other objectives, which subsidiarity will
not consider. For example, if the Community decides that it is necessary
to ensure that Member States provide each other with evidence
concerning international crimes, then the question whether this is best
achieved via a central clearing house and standard formats and defini-
tions of evidence, or via a network of bilateral agreements with minimum
standards, is essentially technical. Member States may have strong
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European Environmental Law Review 176.
41 Farnsworth, above n 40, for examples.
feelings concerning other, non-technical aspects, of the measures, such as
the implications for rights and freedoms, but here they will be bringing in
other interests not strictly relevant to the question of whether bilateral
agreements sufficiently ensure the effective exchange of evidence.
Thus such measures will involve two sorts of disagreement: technical
disagreements about which measures are most effective, to which
subsidiarity is theoretically relevant but as a general principle is likely to
be sidelined in favour of the concrete specifics of the issue; and policy
disagreements about whether such action is a good thing in the broader
context, to which subsidiarity has nothing to add.
In order to make subsidiarity really important in these shared-purpose
contexts the objectives of the Community would have to be defined
broadly. If, for example, the Community was given the power to take
measures ‘to create an area of freedom, security and justice’, then this
would entail not just combating crime but also protecting rights, and the
question would then become whether individual Member States or the
Community could create the best balance, a subsidiarity argument with
real substance. However, attributing such a power to the Community
would also entail that it had prima facie competence to more or less take
over all aspects of criminal and constitutional law. Thus in order to make
subsidiarity exciting, one has to create a higher body with hugely open or
broad powers, which is neither in the interests of the lower body—unless
it has political ambitions to transfer its powers—or likely to be effective or
efficient. One could say here that subsidiarity is a compensation for over-
attribution, but one could also say that it provides an inducement to it:
the more that is shared, the more can be controlled by subsidiarity. Thus
seeking to make subsidiarity central to competence control entails
imagining Community powers as broadly as possible. Subsidiarity
implicitly encourages centralisation.
SUBSIDIARITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
VI . SUBSIDIARITY AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS
Perhaps more important than any of the above is the simple question of
whether higher bodies are really likely to run out of control in these
shared-purpose contexts.42 Is this really the problem? From the point of
view of their attributed objectives, there is no motivation to do so. Acting
where their purposes could be achieved by the Member States is simply a
waste of resources.
If there is a motivation to act even where it is unnecessary it is
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therefore not from the attributed goals but out of institutional motives—
the desire to grow and expand the higher apparatus and its powers. The
self-maximising urge is certainly common in institutions and we may
expect it to exist in the Community. Here subsidiarity provides a policy
and efficiency argument against a natural but unhealthy institutional
dynamic. It argues against the higher level on its own terms; it says don’t
do this, because someone else could do it better. Save your resources.
But it is open to question how often higher bodies, and the Community
in particular, actually get the opportunity to engage in ineffective
measures that are not necessary for their stated goals but are simply
self-aggrandising. Community measures do, after all, require the assent
of the Member States in the Council.43 That may only be by majority,44 but
is it likely that there would be a majority of states interested in unneces-
sarily transferring powers to the Community?
This could happen if states wished to centralise for other reasons. One
possibility would be political ambition for Europe, the desire to build a
bigger, more ‘prestigious’ EU. However, while often mentioned in
various countries—at least until recently—it is suggested, tentatively
since this is really a matter for the political scientists, that when it comes
to concrete measures Member States are usually reluctant to give up their
own powers for such a woolly reason. This is particularly so since
shared-purpose contexts tend to be politically sensitive. They are, of their
essence, matters that are too important for states to let go, and yet where
their capacity to act autonomously is threatened by externalities,
requiring them to co-operate. In such contexts states are usually reluctant
to give up power, and will not rush to do so.
The other reason why they might vote for apparently unnecessary
measures is where there is genuine disagreement about the technocratic
question of which level is most effective. But then they are, in their own
eyes, not voting against subsidiarity at all. Thus this is not a situation
where subsidiarity will add anything to the analysis. While the minority
may cry that it has been violated, others will genuinely feel that it has not,
and the Court, assuming that it is a matter where expert arguments for
both views exist, will be unlikely to second-guess the majority.
By contrast, where one does get real fierce disagreement between
Member States is when it comes to the balancing of interests and goals.
Should privacy be sacrificed to fight crime? Is trade more important than
the quality of sausages? Such value questions are the traditional stuff of
politics, that is to say they are unanswerable definitively, and there will
be great differences of view. In particular, the Community is likely to
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value its goals more highly than those of the states, and vice versa, but it
may, to some extent, be able to influence some states towards its point of
view. In the situations where Member States feel that the Community has
taken its competences too far, the legislation in question invariably
embodies a value-balance that the majority are comfortable with, but
which the minority abhor. Then there is a really important question to be
answered: should the majority be able to impose their value choices like
this? Clearly they must be able to sometimes, because a choice has been
made to allow the Community to legislate in the given area. However,
there is no need to interpret that to mean that measures which, from the
point of view of the Community, are not particularly important should be
allowed when the value-violence that they do to some states, or the
autonomy cost they impose, is considerable. In other words, there is a
proportionality argument to be had. Subsidiarity, however, will not be
involved.
Even where subsidiarity does apply to a measure, and actually bites, it
is not clear that this has a meaningful autonomy-preserving effect. If a
measure fails the subsidiarity test, then this is because its goals could
have been achieved sufficiently by the Member States. Implicitly, that is
then  to  occur{{SENSE??}}.  Thus,  under  subsidiarity,  the  alternative  to
Community action is Community-instructed Member State action to
achieve the same end.
In practice this means that either the Community can issue very
detailed legislation, or perhaps create a new Community organ or agency,
or it can issue general instructions to Member States to achieve certain
goals themselves.45 This effectively makes them Community agents, and
when they are achieving these goals—by legislating or creating agencies
or spending or whatever—they will be acting within the sphere of the
Community instructions and constrained by these and all the other
principles of Community law. Subsidiarity thus offers the choice between
centralisation or co-option.46
This choice may have efficiency implications which could lead in
either direction. Sometimes it is better to act centrally, and sometimes not.
However, its implications for national autonomy are equally open. There
are times when requiring national ministries to devote themselves to
preparing laws and measures to implement Community goals will entail
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a greater loss of national policy freedom than creating a Community
agency to do the same, or passing very detailed Community legislation
which can be mindlessly adopted into national law. The issues here are
institutional. When national authorities are working full time in the
service of Community goals they have less time and resources left over
for other national matters. Moreover, they way they think and work
becomes structured by Community ways of doing things, with knock-on
effects for other matters.47 There is a good argument that the move from
regulations to directives, which was embraced as subsidiarity at work,
and a way of giving Member States more autonomy within the sphere of
Community law, has backfired.48 The coherence of national legal systems
is superficially protected by allowing Community law to be translated
into national legislation, but the political autonomy of Member States is
threatened. Many governmental departments have become little more
than outsourced units of the EU, devoting themselves full time to
questions of implementation—of how to achieve the Community’s
goals—when once they had energy to develop national policy too.
Co-option is here more centralising than centralisation, which at least
leaves the periphery intellectual freedom.49
What subsidiarity does not at all offer is a leave-well-alone option, a
reason for the Community to simply back off from an issue and let the
states occupy that field as they wish. That could only happen if the goal
of the Community measure was rejected as well, thus preventing the
obligation to reach that goal from being transferred unto the states.
Implicitly such a rejection is outside of subsidiarity itself. Subsidiarity
assumes the validity of the goal and asks who should meet it. In the
Community context the goal in question is usually lifted directly from the
Treaty, and so its validity is hardly an issue. It only becomes one where
the real goal of the measure is clearly something other than the goal
attributed to it. However, in that case the measure is annulled for lack of
legal base, or an incorrect legal base, and the subsidiarity question is
never reached.50
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THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
VII . THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE
Subsidiarity has been widely used as a political and rhetorical device: it is
used as a procedural guide at the pre-legislative stage,51 and can be
invoked before the Court of Justice. In every case where it has been before
the Court, the Member States have lost because they have, as in the
sausages and education examples, invoked other interests that are legally
irrelevant.52 The Community was generally seeking to harmonise in order
to create the uniformity that allows easy movement and fair competition,
and the state claims that they were capable of regulating the particular
sector in question were irrelevant. Perhaps they were, but they were not
capable of ensuring that all states regulated in the same way. This
uniformity of regulation was, however, the Community’s goal, and so the
goal relevant to subsidiarity. In each case this inability of the states to
ensure uniformity between states was precisely the argument of the
Court in rebutting the Member State arguments.
Politically the story is similar. No body has pushed subsidiarity as
hard as the German Länder, which were familiar with the concept from
German law and wished to see it acquire teeth in the Community
context.53 It seemed to them that Community law enabled the German
domestic division of powers to be bypassed. While certain matters were
reserved, under German law, for the regions, nevertheless the Federal
Government acting in Brussels seemed to have the capacity to pass
measures that touched on these regional competences, for example
education. Yet as with the lawsuits, the kinds of measures that offended
the Länder were the internal market ones, the ones whose aim was
harmonisation for the sake of uniformity, the goal that only the centre can
achieve and to which subsidiarity provides no answer.54
It seems as if subsidiarity confuses. Each level looks at a measure in
terms of its own objectives. Thus Member States and their constituent
parts look at measures concerning sausages and education and ask
whether they can regulate these things sufficiently. Of course they can!
They have more expertise in sausages and education than the Com-
munity does, and much more knowledge of the particular factors relevant
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to their own state. From this point of view it looks as if subsidiarity is on
their side. However, as a matter of law they are wrong in thinking that
protecting national preferences and culture, or the quality of sausages
and degrees, is the ‘objective’ of the Community measure which must be
sufficiently achieved. Subsidiarity is only concerned with the objectives
that the higher level is pursuing. In order to understand subsidiarity
Member States have to look from the Community’s perspective, and set
aside their autonomous national interests.
Clearly—given their failure to do so in lawsuits—this is asking quite a
lot from the Member States, and it is also silencing the most important
arguments that they have.55 Of course in principle there is nothing to stop
them from bringing an additional proportionality argument to the effect
that the Community progress in free movement does not justify the high
national costs.56 However, the pervasiveness of subsidiarity as the
framework for competence issues seems to blind them to this possibility.
One may expect something similar to be happening at the pre-legis-
lative stage. The Commission has lots of subsidiarity checklists which it
goes through when developing measures, and no doubt if the measure
passes all the tests, then it is put forward with a clear conscience and a
light heart.57 Yet this should not be the case. The really important compe-
tence issues will be still unconsidered, and again the dominance of the
principle may be elbowing more important arguments out of the way. A
linguistic comment may be appropriate: the structure of subsidiarity and
its focus on the object of the measure encourage a blinkered approach to
thinking about these issues.
On the whole, subsidiarity may at the moment be doing more harm
than good. At some points, and in some contexts, there may be important
arguments to be had about who can best achieve given goals. However,
the issue that continues to confront the Community is one of substantive
conflict of goals between levels, and emphasising subsidiarity is not
making it easier to address this openly and sensibly. As a result, import-
ant national goals do not carry the weight in decision-making that they
deserve, while hostility to the Community is cultivated at national level
as a result of apparent disrespect for national priorities.58
An example of subsidiarity not helping may be found in the procedure
embodied in a protocol to the proposed EU constitution,59 for subsidiarity
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consultation with national parliaments.60 Each proposal for legislation
would be sent out to them and they would have the chance to submit
opinions on its compatibility with the principle. If more than a certain
number did so, the Commission would be obliged to respond with a
reasoned opinion, and if the parliaments were still not satisfied there
would still be the possibility of legal action on the question.61
This involvement of national parliaments has a certain logic to it; if the
competences of the lower level are to be protected, then it makes more
sense to ask them if the higher-level measure is justified than it would be
to ask the higher level itself, eg, the European Parliament. Moreover,
national parliaments remain the primary democratic organs in Europe, so
the democratic legitimacy of measures would be given a boost by their
assent. For these reasons—who dares be against democracy and subsid-
iarity?—the protocols instituting this procedure formed one of the few
aspects of the constitution that had widespread support, and the
procedure is not yet dead; the constitution may yet come in, in whole or
in part, and if in part, then this is one of the parts that may well survive.
Yet how much sense does it make to ask national parliaments whether
they are capable of achieving the goals that the Community is trying to
reach? Firstly, parliaments are bad on technical questions—it would make
more sense for the Commission to consult with national administrative
agencies—and secondly, is there any chance at all that parliaments will
actually answer this question?62 It is in the nature of politicians that the
question which will capture them is whether or not the measure is one
that the Community ought to take, a far more open and political question
than subsidiarity contains. They will object, saying that sausages and
universities should be for the Member States to regulate, and face a
technical rebuff because their arguments are legally beside the point. The
dynamic of the lawsuits will be re-enacted at a political level.
The only way this process can make sense is if all parties accept
subsidiarity as no more than a cipher for the desirability of Community
action, a question to be decided by elected representatives.63 But if that is
the case, and the internal structure and logic of subsidiarity is stripped
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out, then appeal to the Court of Justice will be a damp squib; no court will
second guess the purely political desirability of a measure. Thus the
process will be one without teeth.64
The writers of the constitution reflect the same confusion about what
subsidiarity is that we see in the lawsuits and the political rhetoric. Yet it
does have a meaning, and one that the Court and Commission use. Better
to accept this, and with it to accept that subsidiarity cannot do everything
that everyone wants it to do.
CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
VIII . CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
The difference is perhaps between autonomy of organisation and of
policy. Subsidiarity protects, to some extent, the right of states to carry out
missions in their own way. It does not protect their right to formulate
their own mission or make substantive choices about values and policy.
Subsidiarity would therefore be useful within a corporation, or an
organisation where strategy is formulated at the top, and where the lower
levels are expected to be serving the same goals as the higher, and to have
no independent goals outside the scope of the higher purpose. Then it
would ensure that implementation took place at the most efficient level.
International organisations are not like this. Policy trickles up at least
as much as it trickles down, and there is substantive and important and
independent policy-making at each level, with conflicts inevitably
arising. The challenge is how to deal with this. Until recently scholars of
the EU were enthusiastic about models of participation and multi-level
governance, in which the impossibility of clear division of competences
was addressed via communication between levels and representation of
all interests in all decision making places. While the perception that there
can never be a clear line between Community and national activities
seems quite right, it is increasingly clear that participatory responses are
not enough. Even if everyone is heard, there will not always be a
consensus; there is no single policy which satisfies all.
This means that conflict management is needed, which in turn entails
an open acceptance by Courts and Community organs of the fact that not
everyone can achieve all their goals. Member States have long accepted
this, and are used to redesigning their national policies to comply with
Community law. However, the Community, encouraged by far-reaching
judgments on the nature of Community law from the Court of Justice,
tends to adhere to a fundamentalist approach. Its goals cannot be com-
promised—there is no space for that in the Treaty. Therefore it is hardly
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surprising that the Community can embrace subsidiarity without too
much trouble. While it may occasionally result in the reallocation of an
activity from the Community to Member States, its greater importance
lies in the fact that it assumes the inevitability of fully achieving Com-
munity goals, and denies a discursive place to any of the good reasons
not to do this.
CONCLUSIONS
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Legislative measures typically have a whole bunch of effects, and the
objectives of those who support them will differ too. Any attempt to look
at them in the light of just one purpose, or the purposes of just one
involved party, is stifling of discussion and will hinder intelligent
discussion about their value and importance. There really should be no
role for a principle which pretends that what the Community wants is the
only goal that matters.
More aesthetically, one should be suspicious of a principle that refers
to the objectives of a measure. Measures do not have objectives; people
do. Embedding the psychological in the inanimate is a factually implau-
sible rhetorical trick that serves to privilege certain goals and elevate
them beyond discussion or compromise. Suppose subsidiarity were
rephrased this way, which I do not think changes the meaning:
Wherever the Community wishes to achieve something it will make the maxi-
mum possible use of national authorities and bodies to do this.
Would it have such a good press?
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